ABSTRACT Interest-based communities, where users may have diversified interests and consequently cause communities overlapping, exist extensively in social networks. However, this will inevitably introduce more opportunities for malware spreading, whose propagation model is fundamentally different from that in currently widely-studied contact-based social networks. To address this issue, we firstly investigate the basic differences between interest-based communities and contact-based social networks. Then, the problem is formulated, and two malware propagation models in interest-based overlapping communities are put forward, one for early propagation stage and another for general propagation stage respectively. The proposed models fully consider the characters of such environment and reveal the malware spreading rules of different propagation stages in randomly overlapping interest communities. Moreover, the models are transformed into lightweight computational complexity modes so as to be easily utilized in practice. Finally, our models are verified with simulations which are based on a real-world dataset from YouTube interest communities, showing the analytical results match the simulation results very well.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social network has become an important part of our daily lives [2] - [5] , where the malware propagation can be especially accelerated by frequent interactions of the participants. Much attention has been poured into this area to predict the malware propagation pattern, based on which appropriate means can be developed to prevent such propagation.
As a summary of the works on this problem, literature [6] carries out a survey and comparison of worms' propagation models. Literature [7] unifies the most widely used theoretical approaches for epidemic spreading and builds connections among these approaches. The detailed studies of malware spreading patterns in single or multiple social networks are presented in [8] - [13] . Literature [14] - [16] state the effects of inter-layer degree correlations, resource diffusion and communication channel alternation on multiplex networks respectively. Critical phenomena of information spreading dynamics on networks with cliques is studied in [17] . Literature [18] - [20] combine the effect of search engine into social
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Luis Javier Garcia Villalba. networks to investigate the propagation models. Similarly, [21] considers a hybrid scenario where short message service and Bluetooth co-exist. Xiao et al. [22] and Guo et al. [23] investigate the detection mechanism and prevention framework of malware propagation.
However, current researches are mostly focused on contact-based social networks. As another important form of social networks, interest-based communities also face serious threats caused by malware propagation [24] , especially when communities are overlapped each other. Unfortunately, such communities are rarely noticed in malware propagation studies, although much attention has been captured in the aspect of community finding, e.g. [25] - [27] .
The interest-based overlapping communities are substantially different from contact-based social networks, as follows [1] :
• Community boundary. A typical contact-based social network is generally treated as: (a) one community; or (b) several communities without clear boundaries or with some artificial boundaries. While in interest-based communities, the boundaries are clearly determined by common interests.
• Connection pattern. The interaction pattern of users in contact-based social network can be classified into peerto-peer mode. In an interest-based community, the users are connected in a way more like a common logical message pool.
• Node dimension. A node in the contact-based social network has only one dimension, i.e., each node is an integrated entity to all connections. Whereas, a node in interest-based communities shows distinct characters in different communities and acts as an independent member in each community. Consequently, current malware propagation models in contact-based social networks cannot be directly applied to interest-based overlapping communities. Fu et al. [19] and Chen et al. [20] consider a connection pattern similar with interest-based communities, but the communities in their works are totally separated from each other. This is hardly true in practice considering that one user may have interests of different fields and thereby leads to communities overlapping. To the best of our knowledge, literature [1] is the first work on malware propagation in interest-based overlapping communities. In [1] , we proposed a propagation model in non-immune scenario. But this is not necessarily true since most users will conduct some measures to remove the malware in practice. Generally, the scenario in [1] usually occurs in the early stage that a new kind of malware emerges.
Consequently, in this paper we further propose a general malware propagation model to form a complete fundamental for predicting the malware propagation. For integrity, we demonstrate both the main idea of non-immune malware propagation model and the newly proposed general malware propagation model in this paper. The main contributions are summarized as follows:
(1) We investigate the essential characters of interest-based communities on aspects of community boundary, connection pattern, and node dimension, which are compared with contact-based social networks in particular.
(2) A non-immune malware propagation model, or shorten as non-immune model, is presented for early spreading stage in interest-based overlapping communities. The proposed model can be used to illuminate the spreading pattern when no effective method has been found to immunize users against the malware.
(3) A general malware propagation model, or general model for short, is presented for an immune-based scenario where some appropriate method can be used to immunize users against the malware. This usually occurs when the malware has lasted for some time or appeared before.
(4) The models are transformed into lightweight computational complexity modes for easy use, and verified with a real-world dataset from YouTube interest communities [28] . Meanwhile, the models and simulation results show some interesting features in malware propagation, such as:
• Community overlapping can accelerate the spreading speed up to several dozen times. In the simulation based on YouTube dataset, more than 90% of the acceleration is contributed by nodes in overlapping communities, which deserve more attentions in security protection.
• The malware propagation speed reaches its peak when the number of the susceptible nodes is closest to that of the infected nodes.
• In immune-based context, the number of infected nodes will always tend to zero over enough time, and the total number of nodes with immune ability will tend to a stable value (> 0). The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Problem statement and preliminaries are described in section II. Then, section III illustrates the non-immune malware propagation model and section IV illustrates the general malware propagation model. The light weighting of the proposed models is stated in section V. The simulation results on the realworld dataset of YouTube interest communities are shown in section VI, which is followed by the summary and future work in section VII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PRELIMINARIES
In interest-based communities, users having common interest form one community. Each community can be considered to have a common logical message pool, in which the messages sent by one member can be received by the other members.
In a specific community, once a member is infected by the malware, it may create some poisoned link disguised with some normal information, which can attract the interests of the other members. Then the disguised link is sent to the common logical message pool of the community. If some user trusts and opens the link (e.g. with a probability of λ), it will get infected and become a new infection source. The malware propagation from one community to another, i.e., inter-community propagation, relies on nodes simultaneously belonging to multiple communities, which can send disguised link to the logical message pools of all the communities it belongs to. Obviously, users belonging to just one community only participate in intra-community propagation, and users of multiple communities concurrently participate in both intra-community and inter-community propagation.
Consequently, as long as the communities do not overlap with each other, only intra-community propagation may occur and the spread of malware will be limited in communities having initial seeds, as shown in Fig. 1(a) . As a contrast, Fig. 1(b) shows the malware propagation in three overlapping communities. Once some node belonging to multiple communities is infected, such as D (or G), malware will spread into another community having no initial seeds. This will inevitably introduce more opportunities for malware spreading, and dramatically accelerate the propagation.
In this paper, we assume one community has at least two members. The member, or called user/node/host equivalently in this paper, is denoted with h. A community is a basic malware propagation domain where nodes can directly infect each other, thus we call it a base-community. Assume there are N base-communities totally, and the i-th base-community is denoted with B i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ). For convenience, we also use B i to represent the set of all hosts in it. Let λ i denote the infected probability of a susceptible user by an infected user also in B i . µ i denotes the immune probability that the susceptible user, which is at the risk of being infected, is successfully immune against the malware and directly turns into the immune state, or removed state interchangeably. γ i denotes the recovered probability that one infected user turns into removed state.
Let B N denote the universal set of all base-communities {B 1 , . . . , B N }, and {B q 1 , . . . , B q n } (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) is a subset of B N that includes n base-communities in B N . Then, the remaining N − n base-communities make up the set fig. 1(b) , we have N = 3 since there are 3 communities. For a 2-rank sub-block C 13 , its corresponding base-community set {B q 1 , B q 2 } = {B 1 , B 3 }, and complement {B q 1 } = {B 2 }. That is to say, q 1 = 1, q 2 = 3 and q 1 = 2. A base-community B i can be divided into multiple sub-blocks, e.g., in fig. 1(b) , there is B 1 = C 1 + C 12 + C 13 + C 123 . As a special scenario for nonoverlapping communities, there is B i = C i , e.g., in fig. 1(a) , we have B 1 = C 1 , B 2 = C 2 and B 3 = C 3 .
In C q 1 ...q n , the number of susceptible nodes, infected nodes and removed nodes at time slot t are represented as S q 1 ...q n (t), I q 1 ...q n (t) and R q 1 ...q n (t) respectively. P q 1 ,...,q n (t) (0 ≤ P q 1 ,...,q n (t) ≤ 1) denotes the infected probability of nodes in the sub-block at time slot t. Let the subscript indexes of {B q 1 , . . . , B q n } form a set Q n q 1 ...q n = {q 1 , . . . , q n }, and the subscript indexes of {B q 1 , . . . , B q N −n } form another set Nodes in the same interest-based base-community can infect each other through the public logical massage pool. In overlapping context, each user is active as a member in all base-communities {B q 1 , . . . , B q n } it belongs to. Therefore, one node in an n-rank sub-block actually has n parts receiving messages from different base-communities without interfering each other, and each base-community independently involves one part of it. We call such character as the multidimensionality of the node. Thus, one susceptible node in an n-rank sub-block has the opportunity to be infected from any of the n base-communities. Once a node is infected by one base-community, the whole node state is changed, i.e., the n parts of this node are fully connected with each other and have identical state. Similarly, an infected node in an n-rank subblock will also participate in the malware propagation of n base-communities it belongs to, since it connects n common logical message pools of these base-communities.
To facilitate the demonstration, Fig. 2 shows the logical connections among nodes A, D, E, and G, which belong to different base-communities in Fig. 1(b) . In Fig. 2 , each outer circle denotes one node, and the inner circles denote the node's different parts belonging to the corresponding basecommunities. Once node D and G are infected, the logical message pool of base-communities B 1 , B 2 and B 3 are also infected. Then, node A may be infected through any of the 3 base-communities, while node E will only face the threat from base-community B 2 .
III. NON-IMMUNE MALWARE PROPAGATION MODEL
When the malware just begins spreading and users have no defensive measures and risk awareness, each user has only two states: susceptible state and infected state. This is consistent with the Susceptible-Infected (SI) epidemic model, which can be applied in this issue. Therefore, this nonimmune model based on SI epidemic model can be used in the early stage of malware propagation and the scenarios where no appropriate method can be used to immunize users against the malware.
Let λ denote the infection probability between users, S(t) and I (t) denote the number of susceptible nodes and infected nodes respectively at time slot t. According to [29] , we can get the net growth of infected nodes in one community:
where λI (t) can be taken as the probability that a susceptible node turns into infected state.
Lemma 1: Suppose a base-community B is divided into n sub-blocks B(1), . . . , B(n) (n ∈ N) and the numbers of susceptible nodes and infected nodes of sub-block B(i)
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) at time slot t are respectively denoted by I i (t) and S i (t), then the malware propagation effect contributed by the i-th sub-block can be expressed as:
where
Proof: Belonging to the same propagation domain B, the n sub-blocks can infect each other and consequently there are self-infection and cross-infection. Summing the malware propagation effect of all n sub-blocks, we have:
which just leads to the malware propagation model of the whole community in (1). Therefore, Lemma 1 is proved.
A. A SIMPLE PROPAGATION MODEL IN TWO OVERLAPPING COMMUNITIES
To provide a foundation for the successive modeling, in this section we start with the propagation model in a simple scenario that includes only two partially overlapping communities, as in Theorem 1. (4) where
, and P 12 (t) = P 1 (t) + P 2 (t) − λ 1 λ 2 I 12 (t). Proof: In two overlapping communities B 1 and B 2 , according to Lemma 1, nodes in 1-rank sub-block C 1 can be infected by nodes either in C 1 itself or nodes in 2-rank subblock C 12 . And so are nodes in C 2 . Thus, we get the numbers of the incremented infected nodes in 1-rank sub-block C 1 and C 2 :
Consequently, the infected probabilities of nodes in 1-rank sub-block C 1 and C 2 can be respectively denoted as:
For nodes in 2-rank sub-block C 12 , there are the crossinfection from nodes in 1-rank sub-block C 1 & C 2 and the self-infection. As to the self-infection, nodes in C 12 can be infected by members also in C 12 simultaneously through the logical message pool either B 1 or B 2 . Thus the infection probability equals to 1 minus the probability of not being infected by nodes in C 12 through any logical message pool. Thus, we get the number of the incremented infected nodes in 2-rank sub-block C 12 :
Combining (6) and (7), we get the infected probability of nodes in 2-rank sub-block C 12 :
Accumulating the incremental infected nodes of all subblocks C 1 , C 2 and C 12 , there is:
Substituting (5) - (8) into (9), Theorem 1 is proved.
B. CROSS-INFECTION BETWEEN ANY TWO SUB-BLOCKS
Suppose there are two sub-blocks C q 1 ...q a and C q 1 ...q b , where 
. , i m ).
Proof: Two sub-blocks without common propagation domain cannot infect each other, such as C 1 and C 23 . Similarly, the number of the propagation paths for two sub-blocks is the number of the logical message pools corresponding to their common communities. For example, C 12 and C 234 can only infect each other through the logical message pool of base-community B 2 . Consequently, for any two sub-blocks, we can calculate the infection probability from infected nodes in one sub-block to susceptible nodes in another, based on the value of λ i in each base-community B i 1 , . . . , B i m . That is to say, the infection probability λ (i 1 ,...,i m ) equals to 1 minus the probability of not being infected through any logical message pool of base-communities (B i 1 , . . . , B i m ).
Expanding (11), we can get the result in (10) and consequently Theorem 2 is proved. 
where the k-th term is the sum of infected nodes when m+k overlapped base-communities ({B i 1 , . . . , B i m } included) are considered. Theorem 3: When P q 1 ...q n (t) ≤ 1, the infected probability of nodes in C q 1 ...q n at time slot t is:
Proof: In overlapping communities, a susceptible node in one sub-block may be infected only if some infected node has at least one common base-community with it. Therefore, the total infected probability of an n-rank sub-block C q 1 ...q n equals to the sum of the infected probability contributed by each common base-community.
Assuming (l 1 , . . . , l k ), whose length is 
. (14) The infected probability caused by all sub-blocks that just have m common communities with the target sub-block C q 1 ...q n at time slot t, is denoted by (m, n, t). Therefore:
If any wanted (m + k)-rank sub-block C i 1 ...i m l 1 ...l k does not exist, for any time slot t, we set
Then, the infected probability at time slot t, P q 1 ...q n (t), equals to the accumulation of (m, n, t) of n common communities. That is,
Denoting the sum of all m consecutive terms of λ with temporary m-layer operator (m, t), and rearranging (14) - (16), there is:
Obviously, the terms in square brackets in (17) add up to the number of infected nodes at least having the corresponding m common base-communities {B i 1 , . . . , B i m } at time slot t.
Further rearranging the above equations (14) - (17), the infected probability of nodes in C q 1 ...q n at time slot t can be expressed as:
Consequently, Theorem 3 is proved.
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D. NON-IMMUNE MALWARE PROPAGATION MODEL
In order to avoid large deviations of the results in Theorem 3, we set P q 1 ...q n (t) = 1 when the calculated result is bigger than 1, since the infected probability of one susceptible node cannot be larger than 1. For each sub-block, the incremented number of infected nodes at time slot t is:
Accumulating the incremental number of infected nodes in all sub-blocks, we can get the non-immune malware propagation model in interest-based overlapping communities, as follows:
The non-immune malware propagation model reveals the spreading pattern in the early stage of malware propagation which lacks effective immune method. Actually, in all stages as long as no appropriate method has been developed, this non-immune model is also applicable.
IV. GENERAL MALWARE PROPAGATION MODEL
In the previous non-immune malware propagation model, infected state is considered to be a final state. Actually, some appropriate method may be developed and implemented against the malware in practice, especially for malware that has appeared before. In such context, the following actions may occur:
(1) Some users may not click the suspicious links thanks to high level security awareness or the use of anti-virus systems, etc. That is to say, a user at risk of being infected might directly turn into removed state for being aware of the involved security risks.
(2) Some infected nodes may take measures to clear the malware and turn into removed state, avoiding to be infected again by the same malware.
Consequently, in this section we start with an improved Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) epidemic model for single community, as the foundation of later subsections. Then, we introduce a malware propagation model in two overlapping communities. Based on the above two models, a general malware propagation model for randomly overlapping communities is put forward when immune method against malware is involved.
A. IMPROVED SIR EPIDEMIC MODEL FOR SINGLE COMMUNITY
In this subsection, an improved SIR epidemic model is presented for a single community. As shown in Fig. 3 , one node may be in one of the three states, i.e., susceptible state (S), infected state (I) and removed state (R).
(1) Susceptible state. In this state, one node may be infected with a probability of λ, and turn into infected state with the probability of λ × (1 − µ) in case of failure immunization, or removed state with a probability of λ × µ in case of successful immunization.
(2) Infected state. In this state, one node may successfully recover against the malware and turn into removed state with the probability γ .
(3) Removed state. This state is the final state. The nodes in this state will not turn into any other state.
To facilitate the description, we define two metrics about the number of nodes in one state. The first metric is the net change of node number in one state, which implies the change in total node number, due to the nodes emigrating from or immigrating into this state. The second metric is transition number from one state into another, i.e., the number of nodes transiting from current state into another specified state.
According to the improved SIR epidemic model, in one community, we can achieve the net change of node number in each state at time slot t:
where the detailed meanings of λI (t), λ(1 − µ)I (t), λµI (t), γ can be found in the above demonstration of the corresponding states.
B. MALWARE PROPAGATION IN TWO OVERLAPPING COMMUNITIES
As depicted before, the infected probability, immune probability and recovered probability of the nodes in one community B i are denoted as λ i , µ i and γ i respectively, since users in one community have common action patterns in some sense. One user belonging to multiple communities may be infected as modeled in Theorem 2. At the same time, once a user turns into removed state in one community, it will be in removed state in all communities it belongs to. Therefore, a member in an n-rank sub-block C q 1 ...q n has an immune probability of max(µ q 1 , . . . , µ q n ). In the same way, it is easy to find that members in one sub-block have equal immune probability. For convenience, we use µ q 1 ...q n = max(µ q 1 , . . . , µ q n ) to denote the immune probability of the users in sub-block C q 1 ...q n . Similarly, we can find the recovered probability of users in sub-block C q 1 ...q n is γ q 1 ...q n = max(γ q 1 , . . . , γ q n ).
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Therefore, for two interest-based communities B 1 and B 2 which have common sub-block C 12 , there are µ 12 = max(µ 1 , µ 2 ) and γ 12 = max(γ 1 , γ 2 ). In 1-rank sub-block C 1 = B 1 − C 12 , the net number of node change in each state at time slot t can be achieved according to the result in the above subsection, as follows.
where λ 1 [I 1 (t) + I 12 (t)] ≤ 1. Considering the total numbers of users in C 1 is a constant, there is:
Similarly, the net change results of node number in 1-rank sub-block C 2 can be achieved in the same way.
In 2-rank sub-block C 12 , the net change of node number in susceptible state is the number of those nodes turning into infected state or removed state.
(t)]S (t). (24)
The net change of node number in infected state is the result of two factors. The first factor is node emigrating from infected state into removed state, for some successful immunization. The second factor is node immigrating from susceptible state into infected state, due to failure preventing of infection against either or both communities. Consequently, we get the net change of node number in infected state in 2-rank sub-block C 12 : 
The total number of users in C 12 is also a constant:
In the whole network, we can get the net change of node number in each state:
and the sum of net change of node number in all states should be 0, i.e.,
C. GENERAL MALWARE PROPAGATION MODEL
In this subsection, we firstly analyze the transition of nodes in specified sub-block among three states, i.e., the susceptible state, the infected state and the removed state. Then, the general malware propagation model is put forward, which shows the net changes of node number in each state in randomly overlapping interest-based communities.
For an n-rank sub- 
Obviously, the total number of users in C q 1 ...q n is always a constant at any time slot t. Therefore, 
Note that the temporary operator (var, t) is defined as:
Proof:
, at time slot t, the infected nodes can turn into removed state with the probability γ q 1 ...q n . Therefore, we have the result of Z I −R q 1 ...q n (t) in (32). When the malware tries to infect a node in sub-block C q 1 ...q n , this node may turn into removed state once it has a successful immunization in any base-communities. Otherwise, it will turn into infected state. Theoretically, one node can be infected in m (1 ≤ m ≤ n) base-communities simultaneously. Consequently, we use F(m, t) (1 ≤ m ≤ n) to denote the probability of a node h (h ∈ C q 1 ...q n ) infected by m common base-communities at time slot t. Combining with the result of immunity, we can get the results of Z S−I q 1 ...q n (t) and Z S−R q 1 ...q n (t) in (32). As depicted before, a node can be infected through m base-communities at the same time theoretically. To take all possible infecting cases into account, we define (m, k, t) (0 ≤ k ≤ n − m) to represent the probability that all source sub-blocks having m + k common base-communities infecting C q 1 ...q n through m common base-communities. Let V k = {v 1 , . . . , v k } ⊂ Q (n,m+k) q 1 ...q n = {i 1 , . . . , i m+k }, for nodes in C q 1 ...q n , the infection probability through m common basecommunities of Q (n,m+k) q 1 ...q n equals to:
For F(m, t), there is:
To simplify the calculation, we expand the above formula, and define (m, k, t) as the following format:
Substituting (m, k, t) into (36) and rearranging the formulas, we get a new expression of F(m, t):
According to (32), there is:
F(m, t). (39)
Besides, in non-immune model, the susceptible nodes are reduced by the infected probability P q 1 ...q n (t). Therefore, there is:
Combining the results of (39), (40) and (13), the following formula always hold:
In n m=1 F(m, t), the results having identical number of common base-communities can be merged.
In combinatorial mathematics, there is n j=0 (−1) j C j n = 0, so we have:
According to (42), the result can be changed to:
Consequently, Theorem 4 is proved.
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According to Theorem 4, in the whole network, we can get the total net change of node number in three states:
The general model fits the spreading pattern in various stages of malware propagation. Moreover, according to (39)-(44), when removed state is not considered, the general model will degrade back to non-immune model and coincide with the results in section III.
V. LIGHT WEIGHTING OF THE PROPOSED MODELS
The results in non-immune model and general model both need massive calculations to achieve. In this section we introduce three methods to reduce the calculation cost in practice.
As the first method, we analyze the calculation pattern to decrease the operating layers. For non-immune model, it can be found that the infection probability needs to calculate n layers operator (n, t) at most. However, higher layer will lead to continued product of more λ, and consequently has tiny impact on P q 1 ...q n (t). Thus we can calculate only several lower layers for the infection probability when we practically apply it in predicting the trend of malware propagation. Similarly, in general model, higher layer also leads to continued product of more λ, and consequently has tiny impact on F(m, t). Therefore, we can calculate only several lower layers (m, k, t) for F(m, t). This method greatly reduces the computational complexity.
Secondly, in real overlapping communities context, lots of sub-blocks in the theorems do not exist at all. From this aspect, the mathematical meaning of I total i 1 i 2 ...i m (t) is more convenient for us to find the corresponding sub-blocks. Instead of traversing all mathematical combined results, we just need to find the sub-blocks at least belonging to all base-communities in {B i 1 , . . . , B i m }. This can avoid wasting computation resource on a large number of unnecessary sub-blocks, so as to be easily utilized in practice. 
VI. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
To evaluate the accuracy of the proposed malware propagation models, we compare the prediction results of the models with some simulation results. The simulation is implemented in 5000 interest-based overlapping communities from YouTube social network [28] . To provide an intuitive demonstration of the network, we show the logical structure of 50 communities (out of 5000 in total) as well as some statistics in the appendix.
The infection probability of given malware, or the infected probability of a user facing such malware, is considered with three kinds in this paper, as follows:
• Some elaborately set infection probabilities according to previous works,e.g. [8] , [10] . Such probabilities are general in practice, so we call them normal infection probabilities;
• The infection probability of Cckun worm [13] . Considering that this value is measured in large scale network, we adopt this value only in big communities. As to middle and small communities, we use enlarged infection probabilities, since the users usually feel safer in smaller communities than in larger ones, which can conversely stimulate the malware's infecting ability. Such settings will not influence the accuracy of the simulations. On the contrary, it can verify how the models work in more complicated environments;
• Randomly generated infection probabilities during simulation. In order to assess whether the models can adapt to various infection probabilities, we set up a simulation scenario with completely random infection probabilities in range of 0 < λ < 0.4. Table 1 shows the detailed simulation settings of the infection probabilities.
A. SIMULATION RESULTS IN NON-IMMUNE CONTEXT
The infection probability settings in Table 1 is directly adopted in non-immune context. As an original state, we set 10 malware seeds randomly distributed in the network. To illustrate the impact of community overlapping on malware propagation, we also simulate the infected process when there is no community overlapping. With randomly assigning the node to one community of the base-community set, the total number of nodes is unchanged. The incremental number and total number of infected nodes on three probability settings are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 respectively. Besides, the incremental results of the normal infected probabilities in the first 6 slots are also shown in Table 2 . The results show our analytical values can correctly predict the infecting trend.
Specifically, in both overlapping scenario and artificially designed non-overlapping scenario, the incremental number peak of infected nodes occurs when the number of susceptible nodes and infected nodes are closest to each other. After that, the malware propagation speed begins to slow down, and the total number of infected nodes will tend to be a fairly stable number. This is verified by our theoretical model and the simulation results simultaneously. It can also be found that community overlapping can accelerate the spreading speed up to several dozen times. In this simulation, at the incremental number peak, more than 90% of the acceleration is contributed by nodes in overlapping communities, which should be paid more attention in security protection.
B. SIMULATION RESULTS IN GENERAL CONTEXT
The simulation is implemented in immunity enabled context and the results are compared with the analytical values in this subsection. Note that the non-immune scenario is a special case of immunity enabled scenario (with immunity ability equals to 0), and consequently the immunity enabled context is also the general context. Table 3 shows the infection probability settings for simulations in general context. Comparing to Table 1 , we introduce some more complicated settings in normal infection probabilities to further verify the general applicability of the proposed model. It is taken into account that some specific community may have trust degree different from the normal level of its scale. For example, some large official communities may have high trust degree, and some small temporary communities may have low trust degree. Consequently, for the communities whose size is larger than 50, we set that 80% of them have normal infection probability equals to 0.01 and the others have high infection probability equals to 0.1. Similar configurations for normal infection probabilities are set for other communities of different scales, as shown in Table 3 . As an original state, in this section we also set 10 malware seeds randomly distributed in the network. Note again that such assumptions will not influence the credibility of the simulations, since the infected probabilities can be adjusted according to the community characters in practice. The immune abilities of the users are independent of the community sizes. That is to say, the characters of the users, instead of the community size, determine the immune probability and recovered probability of the users. To provide a general perspective, four kinds of immunity abilities are considered, i.e., no immunity, low immunity, medium immunity and high immunity, as shown in Table 4 . In each kind, the specific immunity abilities of the users are further divided into two sorts, where 30 percent of them have larger values and 70 percent have smaller values. These values can also be changed according to specific environment in practice. According to changed infected probabilities and medium immunity setting, the transition numbers from susceptible state to infected state, susceptible state to removed state, and infected state to removed state in the whole network are simulated and the results are shown in Fig. 6 . Meanwhile, Fig. 7 shows the comparison of the analytical values and simulation values of node number in three states. Besides, the results in the first 6 time slots of normal infected probabilities and medium immunity simulation are also shown in Table 5 . Fig. 8 and 9 show the corresponding results for normal infected probabilities and changed immunity settings. As shown in Fig. 6 -Fig. 9 , the net transition numbers of Z S−I q 1 ...q n (t), Z S−R q 1 ...q n (t) and Z I −R q 1 ...q n (t) all experience an increasing stage and then a decreasing stage after reaching a peak point. Obviously, higher immunity ability leads to lower infection peak point. According to Theorem 4, Z S−I q 1 ...q n (t) and Z S−R q 1 ...q n (t) both depend on the product of current susceptible nodes number and infected nodes number. Therefore, their peak points occur when the number of susceptible nodes is closest to the number of infected nodes. While Z I −R q 1 ...q n (t) is only related to current number of infected nodes, its tendency is consistent with the infected nodes number. When Z S−I q 1 ...q n (t), Z S−R q 1 ...q n (t) and Z I −R q 1 ...q n (t) all turn to zero, the total number of removed nodes and susceptible nodes tend to be a stable value, while the number of infected nodes tends to be zero. The results show our analytical values fit the simulation values quite well.
VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we firstly analyze the fundamental differences between interest-based communities and traditional contact-based social networks in the aspects of community boundary, connection pattern, and node dimension. Secondly, after illustrating the special features of the communities' structure, we propose a non-immune model based on SI epidemic model for randomly overlapping interest-based communities. Then, we introduce a new state, namely removed state, and extend the basic epidemic model into the improved SIR model. Based on the improved SIR model, a general model for malware propagation in interest-based overlapping communities is put forward. Both models are transformed into light computational complexity way and can be easily utilized in practice. Finally, the consistency of analytical and simulation results proves the accuracy of our theorems and models.
The proposed models reveal the malware propagation patterns for interest-based overlapping communities either with or without immunity ability, and can be used in developing strategies to prevent the malware propagation in practice. When some specific parameters are left unknown, propagation regularities about these parameters can be found with the proposed models via some mathematical transforms. Some interesting features in malware propagation are specified, e.g., the influence of nodes in overlapping communities, the variation tendency of malware propagation speed, the effect of immunity ability. In addition, the models can be easily extended to be used in revealing the spreading patterns of fake news, rumors, etc. [30] Based on this, the user behaviors and social contagion [14] can also be further predicted, helping to develop appropriate mechanisms for public security.
In future, the models can be extended into hybrid models of primary and secondary layers, namely community layer and contact layer respectively. Combining the interest-based graphs with direct message (contacts) functionality will lead to models adapting to more general scenarios in practice.
APPENDIX COMMUNITY COMPONENTS STATISTIC
To provide an intuitive demonstration of the network, we randomly select 50 communities (out of 5000 in total) and plot the logical community structure diagram, as shown in Fig. 10 . Each cluster represents one community. Nodes belonging to different clusters but connected with a line denote user having interests in different communities. When more nodes (or communities) are added in, more clusters will be connected.
At the same time, the distribution of community sizes of 5000 communities is also statistically processed, as shown in Fig. 11 (a) , where the largest community contains 2217 nodes. Moreover, we make statistics on nodes in multiple communities, as shown in Fig. 11 (b) . Some nodes just belong to one community, but most nodes appear in multiple communities, the largest number of which is 54 communities. For all 39841 nodes, they totally appear 72959 times in different communities (In this scenario, 1 node appears in n communities is counted as appearing n times), indicating one node joins about 1.83 communities in average.
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